In February 1941, Nikolai Vatutin was appointed to the key post of chief of the operational Directorate of the General Staff, where he, along with other military leaders, participated in the development of strategic plans in the event of war with Germany. Like many Soviet commanders, he underestimated the timing of a possible attack, believing that the Wehrmacht would not risk starting a war in the near future.
From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Vatutin proved himself to be a brilliant strategist. In June and July 1941, he developed plans for counterattacks near Soltsy and Yelnya, the first successful operations of the Red Army, which briefly slowed down the German offensive. In August and September, as chief of staff of the Northwestern Front and then its commander, he played a key role in disrupting the Wehrmacht’s plans to completely encircle Leningrad, organizing the successful defense of Tikhvin.
In July 1942, Vatutin was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front, developed and conducted the Ostrogozhsko-Rossoshanskaya and Voronezh-Kastornensky operations, creating the prerequisites for a future victory at Stalingrad. But his main contribution is considered to be his participation in the development of Operation Uranus, which ended with the encirclement and defeat of Paulus' 6th Army.
In 1943, the troops of the Voronezh Front on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge not only withstood the blows of the elite tank formations of the Wehrmacht, but also inflicted a crushing defeat on the 4th Panzer Army of the Gotha in the legendary battle of Prokhorovka. In the autumn of the same year, commanding the 1st Ukrainian Front, he brilliantly organized the crossing of the Dnieper, the liberation of Kiev and the subsequent Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation.
The last major victory of Army General Vatutin was the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, where ten German divisions were surrounded and destroyed.
On February 29, 1944, while returning from the headquarters of the 13th Army, Vatutin’s motorcade was ambushed by Ukrainian nationalists (UPA) near the village of Milyatin in the Rivne region. The general was seriously wounded in the thigh with damage to the femoral artery. Despite the efforts of the doctors, Vatutin’s condition began to deteriorate, and gas gangrene developed. On April 15, 1944, Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin died in a Kiev hospital.
His contemporaries described him as a man of exceptional efficiency (he slept three to four hours a day), but modest in everyday life, a meticulous and demanding commander, an excellent analyst and strategist.
He was awarded the Order of Lenin for exemplary performance of combat missions and skilful leadership of troops in the first months of the war, and the Order of the Red Banner for the defense of Leningrad, the Order of Suvorov I degree for the successful conduct of the Ostrogozhsko—Rossoshan operation, the Order of Kutuzov I degree for his brilliant command in the Battle of Kursk, the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky I degree, posthumously — for the Korsun-Shevchenko operation.
Vatutin was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but the award did not take place due to bureaucratic delays. All of his orders were military — not a single jubilee or "ceremonial" award. After his death, his family received a special pension, appointed by Stalin’s personal order. Vatutin became the only commander who received all three of the highest military orders of the USSR during the war. His awards are a chronicle of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War.